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Introduction 
 
While there has been a considerable amount of analysis on the impact of structural 
adjustment policies on poverty and inequality among individuals (or what we define 
here as vertical inequality - VI)
2, there has been almost none into the impact of 
structural adjustment on inequality between culturally defined groups, or horizontal 
inequality (HI). This paper investigates this issue. 
 
HIs encompass multiple dimensions – political, social, economic and cultural status. 
All of these dimensions are important in terms of causing grievances, and mobilising 
people politically, sometimes leading to violent conflict. In this paper, however, we 
are concerned only with the socio-economic dimension: that is group inequalities in a 
vector of social inputs and human development achievements (such as access to 
education and health services, nutrition rates, literacy rates, life expectancy, infant 
mortality rates, and so on), and a vector of economic inputs and achievements, 
including access to a variety of assets, to employment of different types, and the 
consequent consumption and incomes.  
 
Although relatively neglected in economic analysis, socio-economic HIs are 
important from a number of perspectives – they can have adverse effects on the 
wellbeing of members of the deprived groups, they can impede efficiency, they may 
make it very difficult to eradicate poverty, they lead to unfair and exclusionary 
societies, and they raise the risk of violent conflict (Stewart, 2001).       
 
Because of their clear political significance, in some heterogeneous societies (notably 
Malaysia, South Africa, Northern Ireland, Fiji) a variety of policies have been adopted 
to attempt to reduce HIs – for example, through affirmative action of various kinds 
(giving preferences to particular groups in employment, education and asset 
ownership), through the careful allocation of public expenditure and through the use 
of the legal system to eliminate discrimination. While these policies can achieve 
much, their impact can be severely reduced or even offset if macro-economic policies 
simultaneously work to increase HIs. Conversely, if macro-policies support a 
reduction of HIs, the effectiveness of the other policies will be greatly increased (and 
HIs may fall even without any explicit affirmative action). 
 
Hence it is important to analyse the impact of structural adjustment policies on HIs – 
which is the aim of this paper. The paper is organised as follows: the next section 
further discusses the meaning of HIs and why they are important. Section 3 identifies 
the macro-policies to be analysed. Section 4 analyses how one might expect these 
policies to affect HIs, while section 5 draws on empirical evidence. Section 6 
concludes with some discussion of the type of analysis needed in designing macro-







                                                 
2 See for example: Bourgignon, et al. (1992), Stewart (1995), Singh (2000), Agénor (2004).  
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1.  Defining group inequalities; why they are important 
 
First, it is necessary to consider the type of groups under consideration. This paper is 
concerned with group distinctions that are widely recognised by people in a particular 
society as of social and political significance. In practice, important group distinctions 
often arise from differences in religion (for example, from differences between major 
religions, such as Muslims and Christians, and groupings within them, such as Shia 
and Sunni, Catholic and Protestant); in some societies ethnic distinctions are 
important (for example, Ewes and Akans in Ghana, Igbo, Hausa-Fulani and Yoruba in 
Nigeria); in some – such as India and Nepal - caste is the main basis of social 
distinction and discrimination; in some places, geographical distinctions are important 
(often accompanied by some ethnic or religious differences), such as in the case of 
East Timor or Eritrea; and in others, what we call ‘race’ seems to be the significant 
differentiating group characteristic, such as in Malaysia or Brazil.  
 
Socially significant group identities arise partly from individuals’ own perceptions of 
membership of and identity with a particular group and partly from the perceptions of 
those outside the group about others. An important question – long debated by 
anthropologists
3 - then is why and when some differences are perceived as being 
socially significant, and others are not, both by group members themselves and by 
others. Here we will not enter that debate, but note that group distinctions are formed 
and reformed historically; that leaders, educators and the media, among others, are 
important influences over how significant group distinctions evolve; that groups often 
have uncertain boundaries, and are fluid with new groups emerging and old ones 
ceasing to be important. Yet despite the way boundaries evolve, at any one time group 
distinctions are an important way that people see themselves, and interact, and 
consequently are relevant to the wellbeing of individuals and the health of society. 
Moreover, as ideology has become less important as a source of identity and political 
mobilisation, ethnic and religious distinctions seem to have become more important, 
as indicated by the increasing proportion of violent conflicts that are presented and 
labelled as ‘ethnic’.  
 
While the determinants of group wellbeing and prospects go well beyond their social 
and economic situation and include political and cultural status dimensions, this paper 
is concerned only with socio-economic aspects. There are multiple elements within 
the broad socio-economic category which may be important to people, as noted in the 
introduction. Most of these elements are important in themselves and are also 
instrumental for achieving others. For example, education is wanted in itself (as an 
important basic human right) and also as a means to enhance incomes, and similarly 
access to land represents status and security and also generates incomes.  
 
While certain socio-economic outcomes are relevant across all societies – notably 
incomes, health, and nutrition - what is needed to achieve these outcomes can vary 
across societies, and therefore also the particular inequalities which are of most 
significance. For example, access to primary education may be an important source of 
inequality in very poor societies, but in more developed countries where there is 
universal primary education, access at higher educational levels is more important. 
Equally, access to and ownership of land is of huge importance where agriculture 
                                                 
3 See Banks (1996) and Ukiwo (2005) for that debate.  
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accounts for a considerable proportion of output and employment, but becomes less 
important as development proceeds, and access to housing and formal sector jobs 
becomes more important. 
 
HIs matter because: 
•  Unequal access to political, economic, and social resources and inequalities of 
cultural status can have a serious negative impact on the welfare of members of 
poorer groups who mind about their relative position and that of their group. This 
is illustrated by research in the U.S. showing that the psychological health of 
blacks in the US is adversely affected by the position of the group to which they 
belong (see, for example, Broman, 1997; Brown, et al., 1999). Including the 
position of the group as a factor determining individual welfare has been modelled 
theoretically by Akerlof and Kranton (2000). 
•  Severe horizontal inequalities may reduce the growth potential of society, 
because they mean that some people do not have access to education or jobs on 
the basis of their potential merit or efficiency but are discriminated against 
because of the group they belong to. As deprived groups get improved access to 
education and jobs, the potential of the economy can be realised more fully. This 
was exemplified by the rapid growth experienced in Malaysia as policies enabled 
the majority Malay population to participate in economic transformation (see, 
Faaland, et al., 2003).  
•  Horizontal inequalities can prove a major handicap to the elimination of 
poverty because it is difficult to reach members of deprived groups effectively 
with programmes of assistance. This is especially so because deprived groups face 
multiple disadvantages and discrimination and these need to be confronted 
together. This has been a serious problem, for example, in tackling poverty in the 
Andean countries (see, Hall and Patrinos, 2006). 
•  Finally, sharp group inequalities make violent group mobilisation and ethnic 
conflicts more likely, by providing powerful grievances which leaders can use to 
mobilise people, by calling on cultural markers (often common ethnicity or 
religion) and pointing to group exploitation. Evidence across countries has found a 
significant relationship between HIs and the onset of violent conflict (see, for 
example, Østby, 2006). Other statistical cross-country work supporting this 
relationship includes Gurr’s successive studies of relative deprivation and conflict 
(see Gurr and Moore, 1997; Gurr, 1970; Gurr, 1993), and Barrows’ investigation 
of sub-Saharan African countries in the 1960s (Barrows, 1976). Within country 
studies present a similar picture (see, for example, Mancini (2005) on Indonesia 
and Murshed and Gates (2005) on Nepal) showing that the location of conflict 
within the country is related to the extent of group inequality. Of course, not all 
countries with high HIs experience conflict - it is a matter of increased likelihood 
of greater incidence of conflict as HIs increase.   
 
Hence the extent of socio-economic HIs is an important issue in any heterogeneous 
society and should be a concern for policy, especially in economies which are 
vulnerable from a conflict-perspective for other reasons. Research has shown that 
countries with low per capita incomes and those that have recently experienced 
conflict are particularly prone to conflict (Auvinen and Nafziger, 1999), so it is 
especially important to consider the impact of macro-policies on HIs in low-income 
and post-conflict economies.  
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2.  What macro or structural adjustment policies? 
 
Four types of policy make up IMF/WB adjustment and stabilisation policies: 
i.       (Dis)absorption policies. 
ii.  Switching policies 
iii.  Capital account liberalisation and financial reforms 
iv.  Other efficiency promoting policies 
 
We shall focus just on the first two. The effect of capital account liberalisation –which 
Ajit Singh
4 has so powerfully analysed both for general implications and for VI, 
although not for HI - clearly has important potential implications for HIs although it 
has limited relevance for the poorest countries. This is an issue which we reserve for 
future analysis. The fourth category which consists of a large range of policies, which 
mainly do not qualify as macro-policies.  
 
Disabsorption policies are those policies that reduce total expenditure in the economy, 
releasing resources for exports and/or reducing imports and inflationary pressures. 
Policies include raising taxation and other sources of revenue, reducing public 
expenditure, and monetary restrictions (reduced money supply, raised interest rates) 
which lead to a cutback in private expenditure. Real devaluation of the exchange rate 
also has a disabsorption effect, by reducing real domestic incomes.  
 
Switching policies are policies which aim to encourage resources to move into the 
tradable sector, encouraging resources to move into the export sector and into the 
production of import substitutes, hence improving the balance of trade. Policies 
include exchange rate depreciation and reduced taxes of exports. Reductions in tariffs 
and import quotas, which typically form part of the adjustment policy package, 
however, can offset the impact of devaluation in promoting import substitution. 
Generally, the combination of devaluation and tariff reforms reduces the overall 
disincentive to import and changes the relative prices of particular imports, the details 
varying across cases. 
 
Such policies were highly visible in the 1980s, with disabsorption policies 
dominating. For example from 1980-84, all 93 IMF agreements included limits on 
credit expansion, 92% restraints on public expenditure, 83% reduced public sector 
deficits, while just half the agreements involved exchange rate reforms and a similar 
proportion trade liberalisation (IMF, 1986). Since the early 2000s, poor countries’ 
policy making has been dominated by Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs), 
while middle income countries have done much to accumulate their own resources, or 
to borrow from the private sector, and have aimed to avoid the ministrations of the 
IMF. Nonetheless, despite these changes, the disabsorption and switching policies 
remain an essential aspect of policy making in poor countries as shown by analysis of 
the macro-aspects of the PRSPs (see, Stewart and Wang, 2005). Moreover, control 
over absorption has become an important policy tool of the middle income countries 
in their efforts to avoid needing the assistance of the IFIs, and exchange rate 
depreciation an important tool to avoid a recurrence of financial crises like those in 
East Asia and Mexico in the 1990s. 
 
                                                 
4 See Singh (2007) for the latest of many powerful critiques of liberalisation policies. 
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3.  How would one expect these policies to affect HIs? 
 
The likely distributional impact of the two sets of policies depends on two factors: 
first, precisely how the policies are designed – for example whether taxes are raised or 
public expenditure reduced in the case of disabsorption policies; the balance of tax 
rises and expenditure reductions; and what type of tax, what type of expenditure are 
increased/reduced; and similarly the nature of the exchange rate and trade policy 
reforms in the case of switching policies. And secondly, how the different salient 
groups are positioned in the economy. 
 
Suppose there are just two groups, a richer group, R and a poorer group P, and HIs are 




The two groups will then differ on average as to their consumption as well as income 
levels, so if the additional taxation is progressive (bears more heavily on the rich), it 
will reduce incomes of R more than P and consequently reduce the HI, but if it is 
regressive, the reverse will occur. The two groups are also likely to differ as to how 
they benefit from public expenditure. Social expenditure tends to be distributed 
progressively and the rest of public expenditure regressively, while the overall 
distributional impact of public expenditure varies across societies, but on balance 
seems to be mildly progressive (i.e. slightly favouring the poor) (Chu, et al., 2000; 
Cornia, 2004; Van de Walle, et al., 1995). Then public expenditure cuts that are 
disproportionately concentrated on the social sectors will hurt P relatively to R, and 
conversely if they are concentrated on other sectors, while a ‘neutral’ across the board 
cut will tend to hurt P more than R.   
 
This assumes that the only way the two groups differ is with respect to income levels, 
but the groups are not defined by their incomes but by some cultural characteristics, 
which may affect the distributional impact. For example, some groups save more than 
others, so will be less affected by consumption taxes as against income taxes; some 
groups consume less alcohol, so will be less affected by alcohol tax rises; groups 
differ in the use they make of public services (for example some groups are more 
likely to attend school for cultural reasons), and thus will be differentially affected by 
different types of expenditure cuts. Groups are often concentrated in particular regions 
– for example Muslims in the North of Nigeria; indigenous people in the highlands of 
Peru.  Consequently, any tax increases or expenditure cuts that are not regionally 
neutral will have implications for group distribution.   
 
In general, a typical aspect of a society with severe HIs is that the distribution of the 
benefit of public expenditure is unequal across the groups, i.e. p
p < p
r , where p
p  
represents public expenditure benefits per head of group P, and p
r represents public 
expenditure benefits per head of group R. While ‘neutral’ decreases in expenditure 
(i.e. affecting everyone proportionately to their initial benefits) would leave HIs 
unchanged, such neutrality cannot be assumed as it is likely that group R will control 
the budget and may ensure that the cuts do fall more than proportionately on P. 
 
We have so far considered the two groups as consumers of public goods, but they are 
also producers. As producers, R can, perhaps, be expected to suffer from cutbacks in 
                                                 
5 This is a simplified way of measuring HIs; we might use a measure that also incorporates some 
weighting for different parts of the income distribution of the two groups (see, Mancini, et al., 
Forthcoming). 
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public employment more than P but if the cutbacks consist in labour-intensive 
infrastructural expenditure this might not be the case.  
 
Hence a careful analysis of the characteristics of the different groups and of the design 
of tax increases or expenditure cuts is necessary to identify the impact on HIs from 
disabsorption policies. It is therefore difficult to make any a priori generalisations, 
though one can state, fairly confidently, that (a) tax increases are likely to be more 
beneficial for poor groups than expenditure reductions; (b) however, because an 
important aspect of HIs is distorted public expenditure against poorer groups, 
expenditure cuts may actually improve their relative position, assuming that the cuts 
are not also distorted; (c) progressive tax increases are more beneficial than regressive 
ones; (d) expenditure cuts focussed on social sectors are likely to worsen HIs relative 
to expenditure cuts that protect social expenditure; (e) cutbacks in public sector 
employment may hurt R more than P, but again where the cuts fall is critical.  
 
Turning to switching policies, we again need to differentiate the impact on groups as 
producers and groups as consumers. The outcome on groups as producers depends 
largely on group specialisation in production. This is often quite marked as a result of 
colonial policy and its aftermath and geographic disadvantage. Thus colonial policy 
involved a sharp racial division of labour in Malaysia, with the Chinese the trading 
and entrepreneurial class, the Indians imported to work on plantations and the Malays 
subsistence farmers (Brown, 1997). Similarly, in many African economies, particular 
groups were picked out by colonialists for privileged education and for specialisation 
in cash crops – often a specialisation associated with advantages of geography, so that 
Southern groups were favoured for education and cash crops in West and East African 
countries (see, for example, Songsore, 2003 for Ghana and Ghai and Court, 1974 for 
Kenya). In other economies, settlers took all the best land and the top jobs in the civil 
services, and where settlers remained in the country, post-independence, as in Latin 
America and South and Central Africa, this became a major source of HIs (Figueroa, 
et al., 1996). In some economies colonial powers imported indentured or slave labour 
to work on plantations (for example, Brazil and Guyana) and build roads or railways 
(for example, Kenya). Consequently, for these (and other) reasons, R and P tend to be 
differently inserted into the economy.  
 
Switching policies favour some sectors (tradables) and hurt others (non-tradables).  
Hence their impact on HIs depends on whether the ethnic division of labour follows 
this tradable/non-tradable distinction. For some economies it is clear that there is such 
an overlap, with P being more specialised in non-tradables (subsistence), and R more 
specialised in tradables. This broadly seems to be the case with respect to cash crops 
in many African economies. Below we exemplify this in more depth in the case of 
Ghana. But Ghana is just one example which typifies a swathe of countries across 
Africa. However, elsewhere the impact is somewhat different. In economies with 
plantations and very poorly paid plantation labour, these workers (typically being 
members of a particular group) are often the poorest, with incomes below the peasant 
food producers; for example, the Indian plantation workers in Malaysia or Guyana or 
the Afro-Brazilians in Brazil. For these economies, switching policies may favour 
plantations, and hurt the somewhat richer peasant farmers. However, these gains are 
not necessarily passed on to the workers, but may go largely to the plantation owners 
who belong to the R group. A third type of economy is one where there are incipient 
labour intensive industries and switching favours this sector. The HI implications 
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depend on which group the new labourers come from. In Malaysia, the poorest group, 
the bumiputera, supplied much of this new labour – assisted by supportive education 
and employment policies (see, Faaland, et al., 2003).  
 
A fourth type is where comparative advantage lies with skill or capital intensive 
products (like software services and call centres in India, or airplanes in Brazil). In 
these cases, switching policies will favour producers of these products, who, 
generally, are likely to be in group R. However, in the case of skill-intensive products, 
this also depends on complementary education and training policies that might be 
designed to improve capacities and job access of P. 
 
There can also be regional and HI consequences from rapid industrialisation, where 
one region of a country benefits much more than others, creating regional and, quite 
often, ethnic HIs. China is an obvious example. Thailand is another. Although 
Thailand has seen rapid growth and labour-intensive industrialisation over the past 25 
years, the three mainly Malay-Muslim provinces have remained at levels well below 
the national average (see, Figure 1). While two of three Muslim-Malay provinces - 
Yala and Narathiwat – experienced a significant decline in their relative economic 
standing each falling by around 20 per cent of relative GDP per capita, the third one, 
Pattani, did better, but remained nonetheless significantly below the national average 
(Brown, 2008). 
 







































































Source: Brown (2008). 
 
A fifth type of economy is one that specialises on minerals – for example oil. In such 
economies, the revenue from the resources tends to be disproportionately received by 
R, either directly or indirectly via government redistributionary policies. Where this is 
the case, any across the board depreciation would increase such revenue and tend to 
worsen HIs. But multiple exchange rates might prevent this effect and could be 
designed to help particular groups. A further complication is that non-tradables extend 
beyond subsistence agriculture to import-substituting activity behind heavy 
protection. Often it is R rather than P that is concentrated in this sector. If this 
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protection is withdrawn as part of the switching policies, then undoubtedly some R 
will lose. This may apply in any of the four types of economy differentiated above.  
 
Turning to the impact of exchange rate changes and tariff reforms on groups as 
consumers, the outcome depends on the design of the policies. It appears that tariff 
and quota reductions tend to favour richer groups, as import tariffs often bear most 
heavily on luxury consumption, but such reductions may not be universal (although 
they normally are) but could be retained on the products consumed by the rich, 
thereby altering the distributional impact.  
 
It is possible to generalise a bit more about the likely impact of switching policies on 
groups as producers than of disabsorption policies on HIs. First, in economies where 
there is crop specialisation by group and crops are the main tradables, switching 
policies are likely to increase HIs; secondly, in plantation economies, they may 
somewhat improve them; and, thirdly, in economies in which the policies promote 
labour intensive industrialisation, those with basic education are likely to gain (see, 
Wood and Ridau-Cano, 1996), which in the normal case would tend to favour the 
richer and better educated group(s), but this can be offset by education and 
employment policies that favour the poorer groups; fourthly, regionally, effective 
switching policies that promote rapid industrialisation are likely to lead to imbalances 
and accentuate or create regional HIs; fifthly, where the policies dismantle the 
protection of privileged import-substitution, it is possible that they improve HIs. 
Finally, like disabsorption policies, (but to a lesser extent), switching policies can be 
designed to help or hurt particular groups.  
 
Table 1: Summary of expectations of how macro-policy changes are likely to affect 
HIs 






























Tax rises  Improve His, but depends on design 
Expenditure cuts  Depends on design 
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4.  The example of Ghana 
 
In order to illustrate the impact of adjustment policies on group or horizontal 
inequalities, in this section we analyze the adjustment experiences of Ghana, 
focussing on the evolution of the main socioeconomic cleavage. In the Ghanaian case, 
we therefore analyze how the adjustment polices affected the socioeconomic north-
south divide. 
 
Ghana’s horizontal inequalities and the adjustment experience 
 
Like several other West African countries (for example, Côte d’Ivoire, Togo, Benin 
and Nigeria), the sharpest socioeconomic or developmental divide in Ghana is 
between the northern and southern regions which overlaps closely with ethnic 
differences and is also associated with religious differences. This developmental 
North-South divide arises from a combination of circumstances and policies: 1) the 
geographical concentration of most agricultural activities/resources, particularly tree 
crops such as cocoa, as well as natural resources, notably minerals and forest 
resources, in the Southern regions; 2) the British colonial policy of investing more 
heavily in those regions where exploitable resources, such as gold, diamonds, timber, 
and cocoa, were available or readily produced and cheapest to export; and 3) post-
colonial development strategies and investment patterns (see, among others, Bening, 
1975; Roe and Schneider, 1992; Songsore, 2003).  
 
At the time of gaining independence from Britain in 1957, Ghana had one of the most 
successful economies in Africa, with an average annual real growth rate of well over 5 
per cent, substantial foreign reserves and a strong civil service (Mensah, et al., 2006). 
Ghana’s successful economic record in the 1950s was based on an open economy 
with the private sector as the main source of growth (particularly small-scale cocoa 
farming). But from 1957, Ghana’s first Prime Minister (and later President), Kwame 
Nkrumah, changed this to a state-led modernization strategy based on import-
substituting industrialization. Despite the increasing importance of the public sector, 
the main source of funding for Ghana’s state-led industrialization continued to come 
from the cocoa sector, which provided about 70 per cent of Ghana’s export earnings 
(Dordunoo and Nyanteng, 1997). Although some liberalisation efforts were initiated 
following Nkrumah’s removal from power in February 1966, with the ascendancy to 
power of Colonel Ignatius Kutu Acheampong in 1972, Nkrumah’s policies of statism 
and controls again became the dominant economic strategy.  
 
This state-led approach had disastrous consequences for Ghana’s economy, 
particularly as a result of reduced production of cocoa (partly due to adverse prices) 
and worsening international terms of trade, and a large external debt so that Ghana 
was unable to pay for the imports needed to run the industrial sector to capacity. 
Besides the economic strategy adopted, several exogenous factors, were also 
responsible for the economic crisis, most notably the persistently unfavourable terms 
of trade for Ghana’s main export products, severe droughts in 1978/79 and 1982/83, 
the repatriation of one million Ghanaians from Nigeria in 1983, and the high 
international interest rates sparked by the global economic crisis at the end of the 
1970s and the subsequent switch to monetarist policies in the advanced countries 
(Mensah, et al., 2006).    
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Against the backdrop of the economic malaise of the 1970s, Flight-Lieutenant Jerry 
Rawlings, who took power in a coup d’état in December 1981, established a military 
regime, known as the Provisional National Defence Council (PDNC). Although the 
PNDC regime initially responded to the prevailing economic problems in much the 
same way as previous governments had, in 1983, it reversed its economic course 
dramatically and started to implement an extensive economic reform programme –
locally known as the Economic Reform Programme (ERP)- with the support of the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (Herbst, 1993). Ghana’s 
adjustment policies evolved through four phases: 1) ERP I – the period of economic 
stabilization and recovery (1983-1986); 2) ERP II – the period of structural 
adjustment and growth (1987-1992); 3) ERP III – the period of accelerated growth 
(1993-2000); and 4) PRSP – the phase from 2001 to date.
6 In what follows, we focus 
on the first three phases of Ghana’s adjustment process. 
 
ERP I (1983-1986) consisted of ‘a stabilisation package designed to reduce inflation 
and achieve external equilibrium’, and ‘a programme to promote economic growth 
and export recovery through a realignment of incentives toward productive activity 
and the rehabilitation of economic and social infrastructure’ (Hutchful, 2002, p. 56). 
A major component of the programme was the devaluation of Ghana’s currency, the 
cedi, which changed from 2.75 cedis to $1 in 1983 to 160 cedis to $1 in 1986 (Leite, 
et al., 2000). The government also adjusted prices for other goods and services, 
including the cocoa producer price, retail petroleum prices and utility tariffs. For 
instance, the producer price of cocoa was increased to 86,000 cedis per tonne for the 
1986/87 crop year, which was a 50 per cent increase relative to 1985/86 and a 
quadrupling relative to 1983/84 (Roe and Schneider, 1992).  
 
In the monetary and fiscal sphere, policies included the introduction of ‘strict credit 
ceilings, increases in interest rates with the objective of reaching positive interest 
rates, reform of the tax structure to broaden the tax base and at the same time reduce 
the tax burden on corporations and the cocoa sector, and other measures to increase 
revenue, shrink the budget deficit (through retrenchment, elimination of subsidies, 
higher fees for government services, etc.) and reduce the reliance on the banking 
system’ (Hutchful, 2002, p. 56). The government also launched an Export Sector 
Rehabilitation Programme ‘designed to rehabilitate the export sectors by relieving 
supply and input bottlenecks, improving producer incentives, and reforming the State 
Cocoa Marketing Board (Cocobod)’ (Ibid). In the mining sector, new legislation 
boosted incentives for (foreign) mining corporations, among other things, by reducing 
mining royalties, granting allowances on capitalisation expenditure for field 
reconnaissance and prospecting, and exempting mining sector machinery from import 
duties (Mensah, et al., 2006).    
 
ERP II (1987-1992) inaugurated the adjustment phase and was intended to deepen 
ongoing reforms (Hutchful, 2002). During this phase, comprehensive reforms were 
directed towards Ghana’s cocoa sector. In particular, in 1988, the government, with 
support from the World Bank, launched the Cocoa Rehabilitation Programme (CRP). 
CRP’s two main objectives were to improve incentives for cocoa farmers by further 
raising the cocoa producer price and to lower the costs of the State Cocoa Marketing 
                                                 
6 This overview draws on Hutchful (2002) and Dordunoo and Nyanteng (1997) who both identify three 
phases in the evolution of Ghana’s adjustment policies (although with somewhat different time 
periods); we have added the fourth one (i.e. the PRSP-phase). 
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Board (Dordunoo and Nyanteng, 1997). Nearly 12,000 of the staff of the State Cocoa 
Marketing Board were made redundant in 1987 (Leite, et al., 2000, p. 26). Moreover, 
as part of the CRP, ‘efforts were also made to improve the living conditions of 
farmers with rural development projects in feeder roads, healthcare and marketing 
facilities’ (Mensah, et al., 2006, p. 111). Other reforms that were launched under ERP 
II included the introduction of a new Banking Law and new regulations for savings 
and loans companies; the establishment of the Ghana Stock Exchange Company in 
November 1990; and the adoption of a new Investment Code (Hutchful, 2002).  
 
Under pressure from concerned citizens and international observers such as Oxfam 
and UNICEF, the government introduced the Programme of Actions to Mitigate the 
Social Costs of Adjustment (PAMSCAD) in 1987/88 in order to mitigate the adverse 
socioeconomic impact of the structural adjustment programmes on certain vulnerable 
groups in society (Mensah, et al., 2006). PAMSCAD was targeted at four vulnerable 
groups: ‘first, small farmers and hired labour; second, poor households with limited 
access to basic social services such as health, education, water, etc.; third, the 
unemployed and those with meagre earnings, especially urban youth; and finally, 
households in the northern regions’ (Hutchful, 2002, p. 117). As part of PAMSCAD, 
five types of projects (i.e. community initiative projects; employment generation 
projects; redeployment projects; projects aimed at providing basic needs and services, 
including water, sanitation, health, nutrition and shelter; and, projects aimed at 
improving educational infrastructure) were undertaken to improve the socioeconomic 
situation of the four target groups (Ibid).  
 
Under ERP III (1993-2000) growth acceleration became the main objective. ‘The 
Accelerated Growth Strategy (AGS), published in 1993 emphasized sustainable 
development and poverty-alleviation through private sector development’ (Hutchful, 
2002, p. 57). In addition, the programme ‘stressed the strengthening of inter-sectoral 
linkages (in particular through agro-industry), poverty reduction through labour-
intensive and high-productivity activities, enhanced access of the poor to social 
services, further progress in human resource development (particularly primary 
education and health), capacity building and public-sector management, and private-
sector development’ (Ibid).  
 
As shown in Table 2, Ghana’s economic performance recovered after 1983, and a 
period of sustained growth followed. Other macroeconomic indicators also improved 
significantly, although there were some serious fiscal slippages in the run-up to the 
elections of 1992 and 1996 (Leite, et al., 2000). For example, before the 1996 election 
the mechanism for automatically adjusting retail petroleum prices for changes in the 
price of imported oil and the exchange rate was suspended, which caused a substantial 
shortfall in petroleum tax collections (Ibid). While overall GDP growth of 4-5% was 
maintained in the 1990s, ‘both domestic and export production demonstrated 







  12QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS158   Page 13 









Export of  
cocoa (FAO)  
(metric tons) 
1982 -6.9  -9.7  22.3 260,130 
1983 -4.6  -7.7  123.8  166,390 
1984 8.6  4.9  39.7  162,070 
1985 5.1  1.3  10.3  187,790 
1986 5.2  1.6  24.6  211,420 
1987 4.8  1.3  39.8  218,850 
1988 5.6  2.2  31.4  223,260 
1989 5.1  1.8  25.2  265,810 
1990 3.3  0.2  37.3  269,730 
1991 5.3  2.2  18.1  265,200 
1992 3.9  1.0  10.0  243,100 
1993 5.0  2.1  25.0  278,380 
1994 3.3  0.6  24.9  252,420 
1995 4.0  1.4  74.3  253,260 
1996 4.6  1.9  46.6  371,990 
1997 4.2  1.5  27.9  303,710 
1998 4.6  1.9  19.3  .. 
Source: World Bank Africa 2000 Database. 
 
Although Ghana’s structural adjustment process contributed to restoring economic 
growth and macroeconomic stability, different regions benefited in different degrees 
from the recovery. Table 3 shows how some important adjustment policies are likely 
to have affected the north-south divide. In line with the ERP’s objective to restore 
economic growth by rehabilitating Ghana’s export economy, most external funding 
went to the Greater Accra Region (where the capital is located) and the cocoa, timber 
and mineral industries in the Western, Eastern, Ashanti and Brong Ahafo Regions, all 
in the southern part of the country. Ghana’s northern regions largely failed to benefit 
from the ERP’s economic stimulus (Songsore, 2003).  
 
However, the retrenchment policies which resulted in a large number of lay-offs 
among the staff of the Cocoa Board and other civil/public service institutions also 
predominantly affected the southern regions. Price changes as a result of subsidy cuts, 
fee increases and tax changes, changes in the exchange rate, import quotas, tariffs and 
other indirect taxation show a diverse picture. The impact of these price changes was 
generally smaller in the northern regions because fewer people there had access to 
these goods and services before the adjustment process was initiated. While the 
projects that were undertaken as part of PAMSCAD generally had a positive impact 
on the situation in both the northern and southern regions, due to a serious funding 
shortfall the overall impact was rather limited. Out of an overall pledge to commit $84 
to support PAMSCAD by the international community donors in February 1988, by 
the end of July 1990, only about $15 million in donor financing had been received 
(Leite, et al., 2000). Consequently, overall, the adjustment policies appeared to have 
benefited the northern regions considerably less than the southern regions. 
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Table 3: Distributional effects of some adjustment policies on the north-south divide 
  Northern regions  Southern regions 
Export Sector Rehabilitation Programme    
Cocoa Reform Programme (CRP)    
- Cocoa prices   ++ 
- Removal of subsidies on farm inputs   - 
- Rural development initiatives    + 
Mining sector rehabilitation    + 
Forestry sector rehabilitation    + 
Employment retrenchment policies     
- State Cocoa Marketing Board    - 
- Other public/civil service    - 
Price changes as a result of subsidy cuts and 
tax changes:     
Food   (+) ?  + ? 
Manufactures  (+) ?  + ? 
Gasoline  (-) - 
Tobacco   (-) - 
Alcohol   (-) - 
Education  (-) - 
Hospital   (-) - 
PAMSCAD (+)  (+) 
Source: Authors devised, based on approach of Roe and Schneider (1992, p. 140). 
 
Note: ‘The symbols in this table express the nature of the effects of adjustment as 
negative and positive. The symbols are doubled where the effects have been relatively 
strong; they are put within brackets where they have been relatively weak. Blanks 
indicate that there have been no or negligible effects’ (Roe and Schneider, 1992, p. 
140).   
 
This assessment is confirmed by the regional evolution of poverty in the 1990s, 
shown in Table 4. While there was an overall decline in poverty at the national level, 
this reduction in poverty was not evenly distributed. Indeed, while the Accra region 
and the rural forest regions (i.e. where most of the cocoa plantations and mining and 
timber industries are located) saw a sharp decline in poverty, in the northern or 
savannah regions, in contrast, the incidence of poverty increased in the 1990s, except 
in the rural savannah regions. Moreover, not only was the decline in poverty 
(measured as the number of people living on less than the 900,000 cedis) in the rural 
savannah regions very small, and consequently the incidence of poverty remained 
very high in northern rural areas at more than 70%, but also extreme poverty 
(measured as the number of people living on less than 700,000 cedis) actually 
increased in the rural savannah regions.
7 Therefore, according to this socioeconomic 
                                                 
7 The poverty line is anchored on caloric requirements and is therefore a nutrition-based poverty line. 
‘It focuses on the expenditure needed to meet the nutritional requirements of household members and 
was set at ¢700,000 per adult per year for the 1998/99 survey year. Persons whose total expenditure 
falls below this level are considered extremely poor. An upper line was also established which 
  14QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS158   Page 15 
indicator, Ghana’s north-south divide clearly deteriorated under this phase of 
structural adjustment.  
 
Table 4: Incidence of poverty by region (in percent) 
  Poverty Line = ¢900,000  Poverty Line = ¢700,000 
Survey and Region  Incidence  Share of total 
poverty  Incidence  Share of total 
poverty 
GLSS3 (1991/92)         
Accra 22.4  3.6  11.6  2.7 
Urban coastal  28.3  4.8  14.9  3.6 
Urban forest  25.8  5.6  12.9  4.0 
Urban savannah  37.9  4.0  27.0  4.0 
Rural coastal   49.7  13.8  30.7  12.2 
Rural forest  60.8  35.4  45.1  37.4 
Rural savannah  72.1  32.8  55.9  36.2 
All Ghana  50.8  100.0  35.7  100.0 
        
GLSS4 (1998/99)         
Accra 4.7  0.9  2.4  0.6 
Urban coastal  26.8  5.3  17.1  5.1 
Urban forest  24.8  5.9  15.1  5.2 
Urban savannah  42.2  4.4  29.7  4.5 
Rural coastal   46.3  16.1  30.1  15.1 
Rural forest  41.4  31.6  24.4  26.9 
Rural savannah  70.5  35.6  58.2  42.6 
All Ghana  42.6  100.0  29.4  100.0 
Source: Leite, et al. (2000, p. 10). 
 
In general, Ghana’s stabilisation and adjustment policies did not take horizontal 
inequalities into account explicitly, though the poverty reduction strategies followed 
from 2001 do emphasise the need to reduce regional disparities. As shown, the design 
of the policies on balance helped the already privileged regions and did little for the 
most deprived region – the North – thereby exacerbating this aspect of horizontal 
inequalities in Ghana. Compensatory policies, such as PAMSCAD, did something to 
offset the impact of the programmes, but they were on too small a scale to prevent a 
widening of HIs in Ghana.  
 
5.  Some implications for policy 
 
First, as we have shown, macro policies can have a major impact on HIs, which may 
go either way. Cuts in public expenditure can offset policies intended to improve the 
position of deprived groups, while switching policies can reduce income earning 
opportunities in such a way as to undermine other affirmative action. But conversely, 
it is possible that macro policies can involve expenditure increases which benefit 
deprived groups, and switching policies may offer income earning opportunities to 
such groups, while reductions in public sector employment and import protection can 
                                                                                                                                            
incorporates both essential food and non-food needs and set at ¢900,000 per adult per year’ (Leite, et 
al., 2000, p. 9). 
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hurt richer groups particularly. However, on balance in the one case we explored in 
this paper, Ghana, poverty actually rose among some deprived regions (and groups), 
at a time when growth was positive and poverty was falling nationally. It is therefore 
important to consider the impact on HIs in designing macro-policies.   
 
Secondly, the design of policies can greatly affect their impact on HIs. With 
disabsorption policies in particular, they can be designed in such a way as to improve 
HIs – through the balance of tax increases to expenditure reductions, and through the 
design of tax increases and where the expenditure reductions fall. Where HIs are not 
an explicit consideration, the impact is likely to be harmful, simply because the 
budget tends to be under the control of the more privileged groups. A conscious – and 
possibly politically difficult – policy is needed to ensure that the disabsorption 
policies do not worsen HIs (and preferably improve them). Design of policies is also 
relevant to switching policies. Differential exchange rates may be used to help 
particular groups. And dismantling of import protection can be designed in ways that 
hurt the richer groups most. Again this is generally not a consideration, and reduced 
tariffs often permit imports of luxury goods at low prices. 
 
Thirdly, complementary policies can help to make the macro-policies contribute to 
reducing HIs. In particular, education and training of the poorer groups will enable 
them to exploit the opportunities offered by a more open trading regime. Similarly, 
anti-discriminatory employment policies will permit the poorer groups to participate 
in the gains from international trade. Moreover, compensatory policies can be 
introduced to offset some adverse effects. Again such complementary or 
compensatory policies do not normally form part of the adjustment policy packages. 
Indeed, in the promoting efficiency part of the package, formal direct affirmative 
action comes under attack.  
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